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Introduction: The two-sided matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) can be
interpreted as one where a non-empty finite set of firms need to employ a non-empty
finite set of workers. Further, each firm can employ at most one worker and each worker
can be employed by at most one firm. Each worker has preferences over the set of firms
and each firm has preferences over the set of workers. An assignment of workers to firms
is said to be stable if there does not exist a firm and a worker who prefer each other to the
ones they are associated with in the assignment. Gale and Shapley (1962) proved that
every two-sided matching problem admits at least one stable matching.
In this paper we extend the above model by including a non-empty finite set of
techniques. An assignment now comprises disjoint triplets, each triplet consisting of a
firm, a worker and a technique. A technique can be likened to a machine that the firm and
worker together use for production. Each firm has preferences over the set of ordered
pairs of workers and techniques and each worker has preferences over the set of ordered
pairs of firms and techniques. We call such models two-sided systems with techniques.
There are two kinds of issues we address in the context of this model, now that concerns
naturally extend beyond those of pair-wise stability as defined in Gale and Shapley
(1962). The first issue is about the possibility of a pair of agents being better off than in
their current assignment by perhaps using a different technique. The existence of such a
possibility allows for a pair of agents to 'envy' the technique that may have been assigned
to a different pair. It is natural to seek an assignment that excludes 'envy' and which may
therefore be called 'pair-wise envy free'. The second issue that we address in this paper,
pertains to a situation where each firm is initially endowed with a technique. In such a
situation we are interested in proving the existence of an assignment such that no
coalition can re-allocate the techniques that they have been endowed with, and
consequently be better off. A matching which satisfies this property is called stable.
Through out the paper, we assume as in Danilov (2003) (: though in a slightly different
context) that the preferences of the workers are lexicographic, with firms enjoying
priority over techniques. Modifying the analysis for three-sided systems as in Lahiri
(2004), we show that a sufficient condition for a pair-wise envy free matching to exist is
the satisfaction of a certain discrimination property. The discrimination property says:
given two distinct firm-worker pairs, the technique that is best for the firm in one pair is2
different from the technique that is best for the firm in the other. A modified version of an
example in Lahiri (2004) is used to show that a pair-wise envy free matching may not
exist if a two-sided system with techniques fails to satisfy the discrimination property.
However, if we assume that the preferences of the firms are also lexicographic, with
workers enjoying priority over techniques, then the discrimination property can be
relaxed to obtain the desired result. The weaker version of the discrimination property
requires that for every firm-worker pair there is a technique that is either best for the firm
or for the worker and for no two distinct pair is such a technique identical. Such
problems, which we call entirely lexicographic are the ones studied by Danilov (2003) in
the context of three-sided systems. While Danilov (2003) proves the existence of a stable
matching for an entirely lexicographic three-sided system, a pair-wise envy free matching
may fail to exist in an entirely lexicographic two-sided system with techniques. The
entire analysis concerning pair-wise envy free matchings makes essential use of the
deferred acceptance procedure due to Gale and Shapley (1962).
Our subsequent result shows that a stable matching always exists for an entirely
lexicographic two-sided system with techniques where each firm is initially endowed
with a technique. The proof of this result uses both the Gale and Shapley (1962) theorem,
as well as the theorem due Shapley and Scarf (1972) concerning the existence of a core
allocation in a market where indivisible objects are traded. The proof of the relevant
theorem in Shapley and Scarf (1972), uses Gale's Top Trading Cycle Algorithm.
The preference of a firm is separable if its preference over workers is independent of the
technique and its preference over techniques is independent of the worker. The
preference of a worker is separable if its preference over firms is independent of the
technique and its preference over techniques is independent of the firm. A two-sided
system with techniques is said to be separable if preferences of all firms and workers are
separable. Replicating some of the proofs used earlier, we can show that if a two-sided
system with techniques is separable, then the results that were established for entirely
lexicographic two-sided systems with techniques, continue to remain valid. 
The Model: We define a two-sided system with techniques in the following manner. Let
W be a no-empty finite set denoting the set of workers, F a non-empty finite set denoting
the set of firms and T a non-empty finite set denoting the set of techniques. Each w∈W
has preference over (F×T)∪{w} defined by a weak order (: reflexive, complete, transitive
binary relation) ≥w whose asymmetric part is denoted >w. Each f∈F has preference over
(W×T)∪{f} defined by a linear order (: anti-symmetric weak order) ≥f whose asymmetric
part is denoted >f.
Given w∈W and f∈F, let A(w) = {(w,f,t)∈{w}×F×T/ (f,t) >w w} and A(f) = {(w,f,
t)∈W×{f}×T/ (w,t) >f f}. A(w) is called the acceptable set of w and A(f) is called the
acceptable set of f.
Let W* = {w ∈W/ A(w) ≠ φ} and F* = {f ∈F/ A(f) ≠ φ}. 
For the sake of expositional simplicity, we assume the following: 
(i) W* = W, F* = F;
(ii) For all f∈F and w∈W: A(f) = W×T and A(w) = F×T. 
Any non-empty subset S of F∪W is called a coalition.3
A one-one function η: F∪ W → (W×F×T)∪(W∪F), satisfying:
(i) for all a∈ W∪F: η(a)∈ A(a)∪{a};
(ii)for all w∈W, f∈F and t∈T the following are equivalent: (a) η(w) = (w,f,t); (b) η(f) =
(w,f,t);
is called a matching.
Given a matching η, w∈W, f∈F and t∈T, let 
η
W(w) = w if η(w) = w,
            = (f,t) if η(w) = (w, f, t);
η
F(f) = f if η(f) = f.
            = (w,t) if η(f) = (w, f, t).
Given a matching η and a coalition S, let T(η,S) = {t∈T/ η(w) = (w,f,t) for some
w∈W∩S and f∈F∩S}. 
Given a matching µ a pair (w,f)∈W×F is said to envy a pair (w',f')∈W×F if (f,t) >w
µ
W(w) and (w,t) >f µ
F(f) where µ
W(w') = (f',t) ∈F×T. 
A matching µ is said to be pair-wise envy-free if there does not exist w∈W, f∈F and t∈T
such that: (f,t) >w µ
W(w) and (w,t) >f µ
F(f). 
Note that in the definition of a pair-wise envy free matching if µ
W(w') = (f',t) for
some (w',f')∈W×F, then (f,t) >w µ
W(w) and (w,t) >f µ
F(f) implies that (w,f) envies
(w',f'). However, if there does not exist (w',f')∈W×F such that µ
W(w') = (f',t), then
although (f,t) >w µ
W(w) and (w,t) >f µ
F(f), it is not the case that (w,f)  envies a pair in
W×F.




Thus a matching µ is pair-wise envy free if and only if it is not blocked by any triplet in
W×F×T.
Existence of pair-wise envy free matchings: A two-sided system with techniques is said
to be lexicographic for workers if for all w∈W there exists a linear order Pw on F such
that for all f,f'∈F with f ≠ f' and t,t'∈T: fPwf' implies (f,t) >w (f',t').
A two-sided system with techniques is said to satisfy Discrimination Property (DP) if
there exists a function β:F× W→T such that (a) for all w,w1∈W* and f,f1 ∈F with w≠w1
and f≠f1: β(f,w) ≠ β(f1,w1); (b) for all w∈W, f∈F and t∈T, (w,β(f,w)) ≥f (w,t).
The following example shows that merely by assuming that a two sided system with
techniques lexicographic workers does not guarantee the existence of a pair-wise envy
free matching.4
Example 1: Let W = {w1,w2}, F = {f1,f2}, T = {t1, t2}. 
Suppose preferences are such that for all w∈W, f∈F and t∈T: w prefers (t,f) to remaining
single, f prefers (w,t) to remaining single and t prefers (w,f) to remaining single. 
Further assume that the system is lexicographic for workers, with both w1 and w2
preferring t1 to t2 for any given firm f. Suppose both w1 and w2 prefer f1 to f2. 
Suppose f1 prefers (w2,t1) to (w1, t1) to (w1,t2) to (w2,t2) and f2 prefers (w1,t1) to (w2,t1) to
(w2,t2) to (w1, t2).
Let us consider the following four matchings:
(1) {(w1 ,f1 ,t1), (w2 ,f2 ,t2)};
(2) {(w1 ,f1 ,t2), (w2 ,f2 ,t1)};
(3) {(w1 ,f2 ,t1), (w2 ,f1 ,t2)};
(4) {(w1 ,f2 ,t2), (w2 ,f1 ,t1)}.  
Matching (1) is blocked by (w2, f2, t1) since w2 prefers (f2,t1) to (f2,t2) and f2 prefers (w2,
t1) to (w2, t2).
Matching (2) is blocked by (w2, f1,t1) since w2 prefers (f1,t1) to (f2,t1) and f1 prefers (w2,t1)
to (w1,t2).
Matching (3) is blocked by (w1,f1,t2) since w1 prefers (f1,t2) to (f2,t2) and f1 prefers (w1,t2)
to (w2,t2).
Matching (4) is blocked by (w1,f2,t1) since w1 prefers (f2,t1) to (f2,t2) and f2 prefers (w1,t1)
to (w1,t2).
Hence none of the four matchings above are stable. A matching where some agents are
single can similarly be shown to be unstable, since a matching with any agent single must
have either two agents each on a different side of the market or all four agents remaining
single.
Further, β(f1,w2) = β(f2,w1) = t1. This contradicts DP.
Theorem 1: Suppose a two-sided system with techniques which is lexicographic for
workers satisfies DP. Then there exists a pair-wise envy-free matching.
Proof: Suppose 
(i)  For all w∈W, there exists a linear order Pw on F such that for all f,f'∈F with f ≠ f'
and t,t'∈T: vPmv' implies (f,t) >w (f',t').
(ii)  There exists a function β:F× W→T such that (a) for all w,m1∈W and f,v1 ∈F with
w≠m1 and f≠v1: β(f,w) ≠ β(f1,w1); (b) for all w∈W, f∈F and t∈T, (w,β(f,w)) ≥f
(w,t).
For f∈F let Pf be a linear order on W such that for all w, w'∈W: wPfw'  if and only if (w,
β(f,w)) ≥f (w', β(f, w'))
By the applying the algorithm called deferred acceptance procedure with firms proposing
as in Gale and Shapley (1962) (see appendix for details), we get a function
ρ: W∪F→ W∪F such that:
(i) for all w∈W, f∈F:ρ(w)∈F∪{w}, ρ(f)∈W∪{f}; 
(ii) for all a∈ W∪F: ρ(ρ(a)) = a;
(iii) there does not exist w∈W and f∈F such that w ≠ρ(f), f≠ρ(w), wPfρ(f) and fPwρ(w).
The matching µ is defined as follows:5
If  w∈W and f∈F are such that ρ(w) = f∈F, then let µ(w) = µ(f) = µ(β(f,w)) =
(w,f,β(f,w)). For any other 'a' belonging to W∪F∪T, let µ(a) = a.
By DP, µ is well defined.
Suppose the matching so defined is not pair-wise envy free. Thus, there exists w∈W, f∈F
and t∈T such that: (f,t) >w µ
W(w) and (w,t) >f µ
F(f). 
Clearly (w,β(f,w)) ≥f (w,t) >f µ
F(f) = (w', β(f, w')) say. By the Gale-Shapley (1962)
deferred acceptance procedure with firms proposing, firm f must have proposed to w and
had subsequently been rejected by w in favor of some other firm f'. Since as the deferred
acceptance procedure evolves, no worker descends down his preference scale, it must be
the case that worker w prefers µ
W(w) to (f, β(f,w)). Since the system is lexicographic for
workers, it must be the case that µ
W(w) >w (f,t), leading to a contradiction. Q.E.D.
It is worth noting that Theorem 1 is not valid for the kind of environment considered in
Danilov (2003), after it has been adapted to the framework of two-sided matching with
techniques. The kind of environment considered by Danilov (2003), which we refer to
here as entirely lexicographic is the following:
A two-sided system with techniques is said to be entirely lexicographic if: (a) For all
w∈W there exists a linear order Pw on F such that for all f,f'∈F with f ≠ f' and t,t'∈T:
fPwf' implies (f,t) >w (f',t'); (t) For all f∈F there exists a linear order Pf on W such that for
all w,w'∈W with w ≠ w' and t,t'∈T: wPfw' implies (w,t) >f (w',t').
For instance, if each of W,F,T has at least two elements and there exists t*∈T such that
for all w∈W,f∈F and t∈T\{t*}: (f,t*) >w (f,t) and (w,t*) >f (w,t), then there does not exist
any pair-wise envy free matching.
However, if we invoke the following Weak Discrimination Property (WDP) for an
entirely lexicographic two-sided system with techniques, then we can prove the existence
of a pair-wise envy free matching. 
A two-sided system with techniques is said to satisfy Weak Discrimination Property
(WDP) if there exists a function β:F× W→T such that (a) for all w,w1∈W and f,f1
∈F with w≠w1 and f≠f1:β(f,w) ≠ β(f1,w1); (b) for all w∈W and f∈F: either [(w,β(f,w)) ≥f
(w,t) for all t∈T] or [(f,β(f,w)) ≥w (f,t) for all t∈T].
Theorem 2: Suppose an entirely lexicographic two-sided system with techniques satisfies
WDP. Then there exists a pair-wise envy-free matching.
Proof: As in Gale and Shapley (1962), we obtain a ρ: W∪F→ W∪F such that:
(i) for all w∈W, f∈F:ρ(w)∈F∪{w}, ρ(f)∈W∪{f}; 
(ii) for all a∈ W∪F: ρ(ρ(a)) = a;
(iii)there does not exist w∈W and f∈F such that w ≠ρ(f), f≠ρ(w), wPf ρ(f) and fPwρ(w).
The matching µ is defined as follows:
If  w∈W and f∈F are such that ρ(w) = f∈F, then let µ(w) = µ(f) = (w,f,β(f,w)). For any
other 'a' belonging to W∪F, let µ(a) = a.6
It is easily verified that µ is pair-wise envy free. Q.E.D. 
Stable Matchings: Let τ: F→T be a one-one function. For f∈F, τ(f) denotes the
technique that f has been initially endowed with.
A two-sided system with techniques along with a one-one function τ from F to T is called
a private ownership two-sided system with techniques. 
A matching µ for such a system is said to be blocked by a coalition S if there exists a
matching η on S such that (i) µ
W(W∩S) = (F∩S)×T(µ,S), η
W(W∩S) = (F∩S)×τ(F∩S);
µ
F(F∩S) = (W∩S)×T(µ,S), η






Note: The requirements for a matching to be blocked by a coalition are considerably
different from the requirements for a matching to be blocked by a triplet, as defined
earlier. First a blocking coalition must comprise of firms and workers, while a blocking
triplet comprises of a firm, a worker and a technique. Second a blocking coalition is in
the context of an initial endowment of techniques where as no initial endowment is
involved in the case of a blocking triplet.
 
A matching µ is said to be stable if it is not blocked by any coalition.
Theorem 3: Every entirely lexicographic private ownership two-sided system with
techniques has at least one stable matching.
Proof: As in Gale and Shapley (1962), we obtain a ρ: W∪F→ W∪F such that:
(i) for all w∈W, f∈F:ρ(w)∈F∪{w}, ρ(f)∈W∪{f}; 
(ii) for all a∈ W∪F: ρ(ρ(a)) = a;
(iii)there does not exist w∈W and f∈F such that w ≠ρ(f), f≠ρ(w), wPf ρ(f) and fPwρ(w).
Case 1: #W ≤ # F: If {w∈W/ρ(w) = w} ≠ φ then {f∈F/ρ(f) = f} ≠ φ. Thus, if {w∈W/ρ(w)
= w} ≠ φ, then there exists w∈W and f∈F such that w ≠ρ(f), f≠ρ(w), wPf ρ(f) and
fPwρ(w), leading to a contradiction. Hence {w∈W/ρ(w) = w} = φ. Thus, 
{f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W}≠φ. 
Case 2: #W > # F: If {f∈F/ρ(f) = f} ≠ φ then {w∈W/ρ(w) = w} ≠ φ. Thus, if {f∈F/ρ(f) =
f} ≠ φ, then there exists w∈W and f∈F such that w ≠ρ(f), f≠ρ(w), wPf ρ(f) and fPwρ(w),
leading to a contradiction. Hence suppose {f∈F/ρ(f) = f} = φ. Thus, {f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W}≠φ.
For f∈F, such that ρ(f) ∈W, let Rf be the linear order on T such that for all t,t'∈T: tRft' if
and only if (ρ(f),t) >f (ρ(f),t').
Applying Gale's Top Trading Cycle Algorithm as in Shapley and Scarf (1972), there
exists a one-one function x:{ f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W} → T satisfying the following property:
Given any non-empty subset F
0 of { f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W} and a one-one function y: F
0 →
{τ(f)/f∈F
0}, {y(f) >f x(f) for some f∈F
0] implies [x(f') >f' y(f') for some f'∈F
0 \{f}].
The matching µ is defined as follows:
If w∈W and f∈F are such that ρ(w) = f∈F, then let µ(w) = µ(f) = (w,f,x(f)). For any other
'a' belonging to W∪F, let µ(a) = a.7
Towards a contradiction suppose there exists a matching η on S such that (i) µ
W(W∩S) =
(F∩S)×T(µ,S), η
W(W∩S) = (F∩S)×τ(F∩S); µ
F(F∩S) = (W∩S)×T(µ,S), η
F(F∩S) =





Let f∈F∩S and w∈W∩S be such that η(w) = (w,f,t) = η(f). Thus,  η
F(f) = (w,t) >f µ
F(f) =
(ρ(f), x(f)) and η
W(w) = (f,t) >w µ
W(w) = (ρ(w), x(ρ(w))). If ρ(f) ≠w, then wPfρ(f) and
fPwρ(w) leading to a contradiction. Thus, ρ(f) = w and ρ(w) = f. Thus, given f∈F∩S
there exists y(f)∈ τ(F∩S) such that: η
F(f) = (ρ(f), y(f)), where (ρ(f), y(f)) >f  (ρ(f), x(f)).
Since f,f'∈F∩S with f ≠ f' implies y(f) ≠ y(f'), we are again lead to a contradiction. Thus
µ is stable. Q.E.D.
Note: A characteristic feature of the Top-Trading Cycle Algorithm used to establish the
theorem due to Shapley and Scarf (1972) that we invoke, is the following: there exists a
partition {F1,…,Fk} of { f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W} such that (i) x(Fj) = τ(Fj) for j = 1,…,k; (ii) if  
y:{ f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W}→T is any function with y(f) >f x(f) for some f ∈Fi and i∈{1,..,k}, then
there exists j ∈{1,..,k} with j < i, and f'∈Fj such that y(f) = x(f'). 
It follows as a direct consequence of this observation that there does not exist any non-
empty subset F
0 of { f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W} and a function y: {f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W}→T with y(F
0) =
x(F
0) such that y(f) >f x(f) for all f∈F
0. For if there did exist such a y, then letting i = min
{j/ Fj ∩F
0 ≠ φ}, we require that for f∈Fi, y(f) ∈x(Fj), for some j < i. This would contradict




Separable Preferences: A two-sided system with techniques is said to be separable for
workers if for all w∈W  there exists linear orders Pw on F and Qw on T such that for all
(f,t), (f',t') ∈F×T: (f,t) ≥w (f',t) if and only if fPwf' and (f,t) ≥w (f,t') if and only if tQwt' 
A two-sided system with techniques is said to be separable for firms if for all f∈F there
exists linear orders Pf on W and Qf on T such that for all (w,t), (w',t') ∈W×T: (w,t) ≥f
(w',t) if and only if  wPfw' and (w,t) ≥f (w,t') if and only if tQft'.
A two-sided system with techniques is said to be separable if it is separable for both firms
and workers.
If a two-sided system with techniques is separable then WDP reduces to the following:
There exists a function β:F× W→T such that (a) for all w,w1∈W and f,f1
∈F with w≠w1 and f≠f1:β(f,w) ≠ β(f1,w1); (b) for all w∈W and f∈F: either [β(f,w))Qf t
for all t∈T] or [β(f,w)) Qw t for all t∈T].
If a two-sided system with techniques is separable, then the equivalent versions of
Theorems 2 and 3 continue to be valid.
 Theorem 4: Suppose a separable two-sided system with techniques satisfies WDP. Then
there exists a pair-wise envy-free matching.
  
 Theorem 5: Every separable private ownership two-sided system with techniques has at
least one stable matching.
The proofs are identical to the ones provided for Theorems 2 and 3 respectively.8
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Appendix
Deferred Acceptance Procedure With Firms Proposing (due to Gale and Shapley
(1962): To start each firm makes an offer to her favorite worker, i.e. to the worker ranked
first according to her preferences. Each worker who receives one or more offers, rejects
all but his most preferred of these. Any firm whose offer is not rejected at this point is
kept “pending”.
At any step any firm whose offer was rejected at the previous step, makes an offer to her
next choice (i.e., to her most preferred worker, among those who have not rejected her
offer), so long as there remains a worker to whom she has not yet made an offer. If at any
step of the procedure, a firm has already made offers to, and been rejected by all workers,
then she makes no further offers. Each worker receiving offers rejects all but his most
preferred among the group consisting of the new offers together with any firm that he
may have kept pending from the previous step.
The algorithm stops after any step in which no firm is rejected. At this point, every firm
is either kept pending by some worker or has been rejected by every worker. The
matching ρ that is defined now, associates to each firm the worker who has kept her
pending, if there be any. Further, workers who did not receive any offers at all, and firms
who have been rejected by all the workers, remain single.